This paper presents a discretionary access control model in which authorizations contain temporal intervals of validity. An authorization is automatically revoked when the associated temporal interval expires. The proposed model provides rules for the automatic derivation of new authorizations from those explicitly speci ed. Both positive and negative authorizations are supported. A formal de nition of those concepts is presented in the paper, together with the semantic interpretation of authorizations and derivation rules as clauses of a general logic program. Issues deriving from the presence of negative authorizations are discussed. We also allow negation in rules: it is possible to derive new authorizations on the basis of the absence of other authorizations. The presence of this type of rules may lead to the generation of di erent sets of authorizations, depending on the evaluation order. An approach is presented, based on establishing an ordering among authorizations and derivation rules, which guarantees a unique set of valid authorizations. Moreover, we give an algorithm detecting whether such an ordering can be established for a given set of authorizations and rules. Administrative operations for adding, removing, or modifying authorizations and derivation rules are presented and e ciency issues related to these operations are also tackled in the paper. A materialization approach is proposed, allowing to e ciently perform access control.
Introduction
In many real-world situations, permissions have a temporal dimension, in that they are usually limited in time or may hold only for speci c periods of time. In general, however, access control mechanisms provided as part of commercial data management systems do not have temporal capabilities. In a typical commercial Relational DBMS (RDBMS), for example, it is not possible to specify, by using the authorization command language, that a user may access a relation only for a day or a week. If such a need arises, authorization management and access control must be implemented at application program level. This approach makes authorization management very di cult, if at all possible. Thus the need of adding temporal capabilities to access control model appears very strong, as pointed out also by Thomas and Sandhu in 11] .
In this paper, we present an authorization model that extends conventional authorization models, like those provided by commercial RDBMSs, with temporal capabilities. Our temporal authorization model is based on two main concepts. The rst concept is the temporal interval for authorizations. Each authorization has a time interval associated with it, representing the set of time instants for which the authorization is granted. An authorization expires after the associated time interval has elapsed. The second concept is the temporal dependency among authorizations. A temporal dependency can be seen as a rule allowing an authorization to be derived from the presence (or absence) of another authorization. A temporal dependency can be used, for example, to specify that a user has an authorization as long as another user has the same or a di erent authorization. Four di erent temporal dependency operators are provided in our model. Temporal dependencies are expressed in form of derivation rules. Such rules may be parametric, in that a single rule may denote a set of dependencies. For example, a single derivation rule may specify that a user can read all the les that another user can read, relatively to an interval of time.
Besides these temporal capabilities, the model supports both positive and negative authorizations. The capability of supporting explicit denials, provided by negative authorizations, can be used for specifying exceptions and for supporting a stricter control in the case of decentralized authorization administration 5]. The combination of positive/negative authorizations with temporal authorizations results in a powerful yet exible authorization model.
A critical issue in our model is represented by the presence of derivation rules that allow to derive new authorizations on the basis of the absence of other authorizations. From one point of view these rules provide more expressiveness for the representation of temporal dependencies. From another point of view they introduce the problem of generating a unique set of authorizations. Indeed, a given set of authorizations and derivation rules may generate di erent sets of authorizations, depending on the evaluation order. To avoid this problem we impose a syntactical restriction on the set of derivation rules and we show how this condition guarantees the uniqueness of the set of derived authorizations. In the paper, we show also how this problem is related to the problem of negation in logic programming.
Another issue discussed in the paper is the e ciency of the access control. Whenever an access must be enforced, the system must check whether the appropriate authorization is present in the authorization catalogs or whether it can be inferred from the authorizations in the catalogs through the derivation rules. The activity of inferring an authorization can be rather expensive, like performing a query on a deductive database. Thus, a materialization approach has been adopted. This approach is very similar to the view materialization approach used in deductive and relational databases 6, 8] . Under such an approach, the results of a view are calculated and stored when the view is de ned, rather than being recomputed each time the view is queried. We use a similar approach: each time a new authorization is added, all authorizations that can be inferred from it are calculated and stored into the authorization catalogs. Thus, access control is very e cient, since there is no di erence in costs between explicit authorizations and derived authorizations. Note that administrative operations become more expensive, but they are much less frequent than access control. Moreover, we use proper maintenance algorithms to update the materialized authorizations without need of recomputing them all upon execution of administrative requests.
Time issues in access control and derivation rules for authorizations have come to the attention of the researchers only recently. The Kerberos system 10], based on the client-server architecture, provides the notion of ticket, needed for requiring a service to the server, with an associated validity time. The validity time is used to save the client from the need to acquire a ticket for each interaction with the server. The ticket mechanism is not used to grant accesses to the resources managed by the system. Rather, it is only used to denote that a client has been authenticated by the authentication server. Thus, the scope of the temporal ticket mechanism is very di erent from our access control model. Woo and Lam in 13] have proposed a very general formalism for expressing authorization rules. Their language to specify rules has almost the same expressive power of rst order logic. A major issue in their formalism is the tradeo between expressiveness and e ciency which seems to be strongly unbalanced in their approach. We think that it is important to devise more restricted languages focusing only on relevant properties. The temporal authorization model we propose in this paper is a step in this direction.
A logic language for stating security speci cations, based on modal logic, has been proposed by Abadi et Al. in 1]. However, their logic is mainly used to model concepts such as roles and delegation of authorities and their framework does not provide any mechanism to express temporal operators for authorization derivation.
A preliminary version of the authorization model presented in this paper was presented by Bertino, Bettini and Samarati in 4]. The model presented in this paper has a number of major di erences with respect to the previous model. The current model supports both positive and negative authorizations, and it provides substantial extensions to derivation rules. In particular, in the current model, derivation rules also have temporal interval of validity. This extension coupled with negative and positive authorizations leads to several interesting questions concerning both theory and implementation, that we investigate in the current paper. We investigate also e ciency issues, by proposing a materialization strategy for computing the set of valid authorizations and by giving algorithms for the maintenance of such materialization.
In this paper, we only deal with discretionary access control and not with mandatory access control. Note, however, that the majority of DBMS only provide discretionary access control. Therefore, since the focus of our research is how to extend the authorization facilities provided by a conventional DBMS, we only address discretionary access control. Recent multilevel DBMS (like Trusted Oracle 9]) provide mandatory access control coupled with discretionary access control. The new features provided by our model could be orthogonally incorporated into such systems as well.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the authorization model giving the basic de nitions and examples. In Section 3 we present the formal semantics for authorizations and derivation rules and explain the problems due to the presence of negations in rules. A su cient condition to guarantee the presence of a unique set of derived authorizations, and an algorithm for checking this condition are given. In Section 4 we show how all the valid authorizations can be computed. Administrative operations that allow the users to add, remove, or modify temporal authorizations and rules are described in Section 5. E ciency issues concerning the need of updating the set of valid authorizations upon administrative operations are considered in Section 6. For lack of space we refer the reader interested in proofs to 3].
The authorization model
In this section we illustrate our authorization model. To keep our authorization model general and thus applicable to the protection of information in di erent data models, we do not make any assumptions on the underlying data model against which accesses must be controlled and on the access modes users can exercise in the system. The choice of the data model and of the access modes executable on the objects of the model is to be made when the system is initialized.
In the following U denotes the set of users, O the set of objects, and M the set of access modes executable on the objects.
Our model allows the speci cation of explicit authorizations, stating the permission or denial for users to exercise access modes on objects, and of derivation rules stating the permission or denial for users to exercise access modes on objects conditioned on the presence or the absence of other permissions or denials. Each authorization and derivation rule has a time interval associated with it indicating the time at which the authorization/rule is applicable.
We assume time to be discrete. In particular, we take as our model of time the natural numbers IN with the total order relation <.
We are now ready to introduce temporal authorizations and derivation rules.
Temporal authorizations
In our model both positive and negative authorizations can be speci ed. Positive authorizations indicate permissions whereas negative authorizations indicate denials for access. Authorizations are formally de ned as follows.
De nition 2.1 (Authorization) An authorization is a 5-tuple (s,o,m,pn,g) where:
s2 U is the user to whom the authorization is granted;
o2 O is the object to which the authorization refers; m2 M is the access mode, or privilege, for which the authorization is granted; pn2 f+; ?g indicates whether the authorization is positive (+) or negative (?); g2 U is the user who granted the authorization. 10 and 50 and that this authorization was granted by Bob. Note that an authorization without any temporal constraint can be represented as a temporal authorization whose validity spans from the time at which the authorization is granted to in nity.
In the following, given a temporal authorization A = ( t b ,t e ],(s,o,m,pn,g)) we denote with s(A), o(A), m(A), pn(A), g(A), t b (A), and t e (A) respectively the subject, the object, the privilege, the sign of the authorization (positive or negative), the grantor in A, and the starting and ending time of A.
Derivation rules
Additional authorizations can be derived from the authorizations explicitly speci ed. The derivation is based on temporal propositions, used as rules, which allow new temporal authorizations to be derived on the basis of the presence or the absence of other temporal authorizations. Derivation rules can be applied to both positive as well as negative authorizations. Like authorizations, derivation rules have a time interval associated with them. The time interval associated with a derivation rule indicates the set of instants in which the rule is applied. Derivation rules can also contain variables in their speci cation. We refer to derivation rules where all the terms in the authorizations are explicitly speci ed as ground derivation rules and to derivation rules containing variables as parametric derivation rules.
Ground derivation rules
Ground derivation rules are de ned as follows.
De nition 2.3 (Ground derivation rule) A ground derivation rule is de ned as ( The formal semantics of the temporal operators used in the derivation rules will be given in Section 3. Their intuitive semantics is as follows:
( t b ,t e ], A 1 whenever A 2 ).
We can derive A 1 for each instant in t b ,t e ] for which A 2 is given or derived. For example, rule R 1 in Figure 1 , speci ed by Sam (A1) ( 10, 20] , (Ann,o1,read,+,Sam)) (A2) ( 30, 40] , (Ann,o1,read,+,Sam)) (R1) ( 7, 35] , (Chris,o1,read,+,Sam) whenever (Ann,o1,read,+,Sam)) (R2) ( 10, 35] , (Matt,o1,read,+,Sam) aslongas (Ann,o1,read,+,Sam)) (R3) ( 5, 1] (John,o1 ,read,+,Sam) whenevernot (Ann,o1,read,+,Sam)) (R4) ( 5, 15] , (Bob,o1,read,+,Sam) unless (Ann,o1,read,+,Sam)) (R5) ( 1, 80] , (Jim,o1,read,+,Sam) whenever (Bob,o1,read,+,Sam)) Figure 1 : An example of authorizations and derivation rules ( 5, 9] , (Bob,o 1 ,read,+,Sam)) from rule R 4 . ( 5, 9] , (Jim,o 1 ,read,+,Sam)) from rules R 4 and R 5 . 4 
Authorizations and derivation rules speci cation
Before proceeding to illustrate the semantics of derivation rules and authorizations we need to make a remark on authorizations and rules. In our model, only users explicitly authorized can specify authorizations and derivation rules. Administrative privileges give users the authority of granting accesses on objects to users either directly (explicit authorizations) or indirectly (through derivation rules). Three di erent administrative privileges are considered: refer, administer, and own. The semantics of these privileges is as follows.
refer: If a user has the refer privilege on an object, he can refer to the object in a derivation rule, i.e., the object can appear at the right of the temporal operator in a derivation rule speci ed by the user.
administer: If a user has the administer privilege on an object, he can grant to and revoke from other users authorizations to access the object (either explicitly or through rules).
own: It indicates possession of an object. When a user creates an object he receives the own privilege on it. The own privilege allows the user to grant and revoke access authorizations as well as to grant and revoke administrative privileges (but own) on his object.
Administrative authorizations, i.e., authorizations for administrative privileges are not constrained to a speci c time interval but hold from the time at which they are speci ed until the time they are revoked by the object's owner. However, for sake of simplicity and uniformity with respect to other authorizations, we associate time intervals also to administrative authorizations. The time interval associated with an administrative authorization spans from the time at which the authorization is speci ed to 1. Administrative authorizations are formally de ned as follows.
De nition 2.4 (Administrative authorization) An administrative authorization is de ned as ( t b ; 1], (s,o,p)) where t b ; 1] is the time interval associated with the authorization, s 2 U is the user to whom the authorization is granted, o 2 O is the object on which the authorization is speci ed, and p is the administrative privilege granted to s. These conditions are checked at the time an authorization/rule is speci ed and the insertion of the authorization/rule is accepted only if the conditions are satis ed 1 .
Parametric derivation rules
Derivation rules can also use variables in their speci cation. We refer to these rules as parametric derivation rules. To introduce parametric derivation rules, we rst give the de nition of authorization pattern.
De nition 2.5 (Authorization pattern) An authorization pattern AP is a tuple (s,o,m,pn,g) where s,g 2 U f g, o 2 O f g, m 2 M f g, and pn 2 f+; ?g.
(A1) ( 10, 1] , (sam-friends,o1 ,read,+,Sam)) (A2) ( 20, 200] , (sam-friends,o1 ,write,+,Sam)) (A3) ( 20, 1] , (sam-friends,o2 ,read,+,Sam)) (A4) ( 10, 1] , (sam-friends,o2 ,write,+,Sam)) (A5) ( 50, 1] , (Jim,o2,write,-,John)) (R1) ( 1, 1] , (Chris,*,*,+,Sam) whenever (sam-friends,*,*,+,Sam)) (R2) ( 1, 100] , (Matt,*,*,+,Sam) whenever (sam-friends,*,*,+,Sam)) (R3) ( A parametric derivation rule can be seen as a shorthand for specifying several ground derivation rules operating on di erent subjects, objects, or access modes. Given a parametric derivation rule, we refer to the ground rules to which it corresponds as instances of the parametric rule. This is expressed by the following de nition.
De nition 2.8 (Parametric rule instances) Let R = ( t b ,t e ], AP 1 hopi AP 2 ) be a parametric derivation rule. The set of instances of R is the set composed of all possible ground derivation rules ( t b ,t e ], A m hopi A n ) such that A m matches AP 1 , A n matches AP 2 , and such that the following conditions are satis ed:
Note that instances derived from parametric rules must also satisfy the constraints on administrative privileges illustrated in the previous section for rules.
The following example illustrates the use of parametric derivation rules.
Example 2.2 Sam wishes to grant the authorization to exercise a certain number of access modes on certain objects to a group of friends, Chris, Matt, and Jim. Instead of specifying one authorization for every access mode and every object for each of his friends, Sam can proceed as follows. A new user sam-friends, playing the role of the group is de ned. For each user that Sam wishes to include in the group, a whenever rule parametric over the object and the access mode is de ned where the authorization at the left of the operator has as subject the user identi er and the authorization at the right has as subject sam-friends (see Figure 2 ). The time interval associated with the rule can be interpreted as the time interval at which the user appearing on the left is considered as a member of group sam-friends. For example, rules R 1 ,R 2 , and R 3 in Figure 2 allow given a positive authorization speci ed for sam-friends, to derive the same authorization for for Chris, Matt, and Jim respectively. Rule R 2 expires at time 100 (intuitively, after that time Matt will not be considered anymore a member of the group); hence, the time interval associated with the authorizations derived for Matt will have ending time equal to 100. 4 In the example above, Sam appears as grantor of the authorization on the right of the operators in rules R 1 -R 3 . Hence, authorizations for Chris, Matt, and Jim will be derived only from authorizations granted to sam-friends by Sam. Sam can require the rules to re regardless of the grantor of the authorizations to sam-friends by putting ' as grantor in the right side of rules R 1 -R 3 .
Formal semantics
In this section we formalize the semantics of temporal authorizations and derivation rules. First of all it is necessary to point out that the possibility to express negative authorizations introduces potential con icts among authorizations. Suppose that a negative authorization for a privilege on an object is granted to a user who has previously obtained the same privilege on that object. We then have, for a given time interval, the presence of both negative and positive authorizations. This is not to be intended as an inconsistency, since we consider negative authorizations as prevailing with respect to positive authorizations. Considering the set of authorizations and rules in Figure 2 , from rule R 3 and authorization A 4 we can derive ( 10, 1] ,(Jim,o 2 ,write,+,Sam)). By authorization A 5 we have ( 50,1],(Jim,o 2 ,write,-,John)). This is not an inconsistency, since we apply the denials-take-precedence principle. Hence, the negative authorization prevails, and Jim will have the authorization to write object o 2 only in the interval 10, 49] . The formal semantics obeys to the denials-take-precedence principle. We start the description of the formal semantics by introducing the concept of a TAB.
De nition 3.1 (Temporal Authorization Base) A Temporal Authorization Base (TAB) is a set of temporal
authorizations and derivation rules.
In the rest of the paper, we denote with INST-TAB a TAB where each parametric rule has been substituted by its set of instances according to De nition 2.8. Obviously, TAB and INST-TAB are equivalent.
The semantics of a TAB is given as a set of clauses in a general logic program corresponding to INST-TAB. We use a logic with two sorts, the natural numbers (IN) as a temporal sort and a generic domain (D) as the other sort. The language includes constant symbols 1; 2; : : : for natural numbers, a nite set of constant symbols (e.g., s 1 ; o 1 ; m 1 ; g 1 ; ?; +; s 2 ; : : :) for elements in D, and temporal variable symbols t; t 0 ; t 00 . Predicate symbols include the temporal predicate symbols and < with the xed interpretation of the corresponding order relation on natural numbers, the predicate symbol F() with temporal arity 1 and domain arity 5, the predicate symbols F N () and F G () with temporal arity 2 and domain arity 5, and the predicate symbol G() with temporal arity 1 and domain arity 3. The resulting language is very similar to the temporal deductive language proposed in 2] with the main di erence being the presence of negation in our rules.
For each type of authorization/rule in INST-TAB, Table 1 reports its corresponding clause/set of clauses.
Intuitively, the predicate F() is used to represent the authorizations at speci c instants. The fact that F(t; A)
is true in an interpretation corresponds to the validity of A at instant t according to that interpretation. The predicates G(); F N () and F P () are auxiliary predicates, used to avoid quanti cation. Intuitively, G(t; s; o; m) is true in an interpretation if there is at least one negative authorization, with the same s,o,m, valid at instant t according to that interpretation. F N (t 00 ; t; A) is true in an interpretation if there is at least an instant t 0 with t 00 t 0 < t at which authorization A is false according to that interpretation. F P (t 00 ; t; A) is true in an interpretation if there is at least an instant t 0 with t 00 t 0 < t at which authorization A is true according to that interpretation. We denote the logic program corresponding to a TAB with P TAB . We consider stable model semantics of logic programs with negation 7] to identify the models 2 
Restrictions on rules
An important property that we require for our set of temporal authorizations and rules is that we must always be able to derive a unique set of valid authorizations. This means, for example, that each set of rules together with a xed set of explicit authorizations should not derive di erent authorizations depending on the evaluation order. We give an example illustrating how di erent authorizations can be derived depending on the evaluation order. 4 From the point of view of the semantics that we have given, the property of always having a unique set of valid authorizations is guaranteed only if there exists a unique model of the program corresponding to the TAB. Hence, we limit derivation rules so that a unique model can be computed. In the rest of this section we formally de ne sets of rules that should be avoided in order to guarantee a unique model for P TAB , and we give an algorithm for their detection.
In the following, we use the term negative operator (negop) to refer to whenevernot or unless, and negative rule to refer to a rule using a negative operator. Similarly, positive operator (posop) is used to refer to whenever or aslongas, present operator (presentop) is used to refer to whenever or whenevernot, and Note that the second condition in the above de nition implies that each negative authorization has higher priority than its positive counterpart at the same instant.
We are now ready to identify critical sets of derivation rules. The CSD (Critical Set Detection) algorithm, described in the next subsection, can be used to recognize and reject a TAB containing a critical set.
An algorithm for critical set detection
We use a set of disjoint 3 intervals T = f t i ; t j ]; : : : ; t r ; t s ]g as a compact notation for the set of natural numbers included in these intervals. Hence, the operations of union (T 1 T 2 ), intersection (T 1 \T 2 ), and di erence (T 1 nT 2 ) have the usual semantics of set operations. However, we implement these operations so that they can be performed using intervals and giving the result as a set of disjoint intervals. We use two kinds of set membership: t 2 T is true if t is one of the natural numbers represented by T, t i ; t j ] 2 T is true if the interval t i ; t j ] is exactly one of the disjoint intervals of T.
Given a INST-TAB, the algorithm for critical set detection returns FALSE if a critical set exists in TAB;
otherwise it returns a sequence of sets (levels) hL 1 ; : : : ; L k i representing a partition of the set of pairs hA; ti for each authorization A appearing (either explicitly or in a rule) in INST-TAB and for each instant t between 1 and t max . We de ne t max to be the rst instant greater than the maximum temporal constant appearing in INST-TAB. In the following, we refer to each set L i as level i. If pair hA; Ti is in level i , we say that A is in level i for each t 2 T. Intuitively, authorizations appearing at lower levels for a certain set of instants have higher priority for evaluation than authorizations appearing at higher levels (for the same or di erent sets of instants). In this and other algorithms in the paper, we use the functions`Add()' and`Delete()' to add/delete or modify The algorithm is reported in Figures 3,4 , and 5, and it works as follows. In step 1, t max is substituted for each occurrence of symbol`1' in time intervals associated with authorizations and rules in INST-TAB. There is no need to consider all time instants up to 1. For instants greater than t max the authorizations that are valid remain unchanged. If a critical set exists, it will be found at a time lower than or equal to t max . In step 2, max-level is determined as the number of authorizations appearing in INST-TAB multiplied by t max . max-level corresponds to the number of pairs hA; ti to be partitioned. Then, the number of levels (top-level) is initialized to 1. Level 1 initially contains all authorizations in INST-TAB for each instant between 1 and t max .
Step 3 recursively calls function`check-levels()' which examines the authorizations at di erent levels and the dependencies among authorizations. It possibly changes level to pairs hA; Ti on the basis of the dependency. The loop at step 3 ends when the last call of`check-levels()' does not change any level or the level number is greater than max-level. In the rst case, the levels constructed by the algorithm are returned. In the second case, FALSE is returned. Function`check-levels()' is composed of three steps. In step 1, all levels from top-level to 1 are examined. If a negative authorization A n is found at a given level l for a certain set of time intervals T n;l , the level of all positive authorizations A m having same subject, object, and access mode as A n and appearing at a level lower than l is increased to l + 1 for all time instants in T n;l . In step 2, all the rules R = ( t b ; t e ]; A m hpresentopi A n ) are evaluated. Levels are examined in decreasing order starting from top-level. Every time authorization A n is found at level l for a time interval T n;l not disjoint from t b ; t e ], function`update()' is called to increase the level of A m for the time instants appearing in both T n;l and t b ; t e ]. The new level is l, if the operator in the rule is whenever, and l + 1, if it is whenevernot. In step 2, all the rules R = ( t b ; t e ]; A m pastop A n ) are evaluated.
Again, levels are examined in decreasing order starting from top-level. Every time authorization A n is found at level l for a time interval T n;l not disjoint from t b ; t e ], function`update()' is called to increase the level of A m for the time instants t b ; t e ] greater than or equal to the minimum instant t l in both t b ; t e ] and T n;l . The new level is l, for instant t l , and l + 1, for instants in t b ; t e ] greater than it. Function`update()', given a level lev, an authorization A m , and a set of time intervals T, brings authorization A m at level lev for each time instant for which A m appears at levels lower than lev. Example 3.3 Consider a TAB containing the following authorizations and rules: ( 10, 200 4 
Correctness of the CSD algorithm and model uniqueness
The following two theorems state some properties of the levels returned by the CSD algorithm with respect to the dependencies among authorizations. Theorem 3.1 Let A n and A m be two authorizations appearing in INST-TAB and t; t 0 be two time instants lower than or equal to t max such that A n t] , ! A m t 0 ]. Then, either the algorithm returns FALSE or, at the end of the execution, authorization A m for instant t 0 appears at a level higher than or equal to that of authorization A n for instant t. If , ! is a strict dependency then A m for instant t 0 appears at a level higher than that of A n for instant t. Theorem 3.2 Let A n and A m be two authorizations appearing in INST-TAB with same subject, access mode, and object but with di erent sign. Then, either the algorithm returns FALSE or, at the end of the execution, the positive authorization appears at a level higher than that of the negative authorization for each time instant between 1 and t max .
The correctness of the CSD algorithm is stated by the following theorem. Theorem 3.3 Given a TAB, i) the CSD algorithm terminates and ii) it returns a FALSE value if and only if the TAB contains a critical set.
As we have observed, for the purpose of determining the authorization state of the system at a certain instant, the uniqueness of the P TAB model at that instant is required. The uniqueness of the model in absence of critical sets is guaranteed by the following theorem. Theorem 3.4 Given a TAB with no critical sets, the corresponding logic program P TAB has a unique model.
Materialization of authorizations
In our model, the control of whether a request to access an object for a given access mode can be authorized may require the evaluation of several rules. Two di erent strategies can be used to enforce access control:
Function check-levels(hL 1 ; : : : ; L top-level i) 1 Materialization: The system permanently maintains all the valid authorizations, both explicit and derived.
Upon an access request, the system can immediately check whether a valid corresponding positive authorization exists.
Both these approaches have some pros and cons. The rst approach has the advantage that no actions are required upon modi cation of the TAB; however access control becomes cumbersome since each access request may require the computation of derived authorizations. In the second approach, this run-time computation is avoided at the price of explicitly maintaining the derived authorizations that will have to be updated every time the TAB is modi ed.
Since, generally, access requests are considerably more frequent than administrative requests modifying authorizations and/or rules, we argue that the second approach is preferable. Moreover, the drawback provided by the need of recalculating the explicit authorizations upon modi cations to the TAB can be overcome by the application of e cient algorithms that update the materialized authorizations upon modi cations without need of reconsidering all rules and recomputing all the materialized authorizations.
For the reasons above, we adopt the materialization approach. In the following we illustrate how to compute, given a TAB, the corresponding valid authorizations. In Section 6 we will provide algorithms for re ecting changes to the TAB in the materialized authorizations without the need of recomputing all authorizations from the beginning.
De nition 4.1 (Temporal Authorization Base Extent) The Temporal Authorization Base Extent (TAB EXT )
of TAB is the set of valid authorizations derived from TAB. TAB EXT contains all the valid authorizations of TAB computed according to the semantics of explicit authorizations and derivation rules.
Authorizations are maintained in TAB EXT using a compact representation: each A k is associated with a set T k of disjoint intervals, representing the instants at which A k is valid.
At time t=0, TAB EXT does not contain any explicit or derived authorizations. Upon the execution of each administrative operation (such as grant/revoke of authorizations or rules) TAB EXT is updated to re ect the e ects of the operation execution.
If the strategy of maintaining both explicit and derived authorizations is not adopted from the beginning, it is necessary to populate TAB EXT from the explicit authorizations and derivation rules already present in TAB. If there is no critical set, the CSD algorithm returns a sequence of levels hL 1 ; : : : ; L k i such that, for each authorization, the corresponding set of instants 1; : : : ; t max is partitioned among the k levels. This sequence is essential to establish an evaluation order that guarantees that the computed TAB EXT contains all and only valid authorizations. If we have derived an authorization for the instant t max , we are guaranteed that the authorization can be derived for any instant greater than t max .
This fact is due to the particular form of our rules and it is formally proved as part of the proof of Theorem 4.1.
The following example illustrates an application of the algorithm for TAB EXT generation.
Algorithm 4.1 INPUT:
The output hL1; : : : ; L k i of the CSD Algorithm and INST-TAB. OUTPUT: 1) TABEXT =fhAi; Tii j Ai is a valid authorization for each interval in Tig 2) A sequence hX1 There are no more levels, t max = 201 in this example and it does not appear in TAB (3) EXT . Hence, the algorithm terminates returning TAB (3) EXT . 4 The correctness of the algorithm is stated by the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 Given TAB EXT as returned by Algorithm 4.1, an authorization A is valid at time t if and only if there exists hA; Ti in TAB EXT with t 2 T.
Once we have an updated TAB EXT , each access request can be checked against TAB EXT . An access request from user s 1 to exercise access mode m 1 on object o 1 at time t will be allowed only if a pair hA; Ti exists in TAB EXT such that s(A)=s 1 , o(A)=o 1 , m(A)=m 1 , pn(A)=`+', and t 2 T.
TAB administration
Administrative operations allow the users to add, remove, or modify temporal authorizations and derivation rules and to give or revoke other users the right to administer their objects or to refer to them in derivation rules. Each temporal authorization, and each derivation rule in the TAB is identi ed by a unique label assigned by the system at the time of its insertion. The label allows the user to refer to a speci c temporal authorization or derivation rule upon execution of administrative operations. In the following we discuss the administrative operations considered in our model. The syntax of the operations in BNF form is given in Table 2 . With reference to the gure, non terminal symbols hsubjecti, hobjecti,haccess-modei, hauth-ti, and hnat-numberi represent elements of the domains S, O; M; f+; ?g; and IN respectively. Non terminal symbols haidi and hridi represent system labels. Symbol # can be used in the speci cation of the starting time for an authorization/rule to indicate the time at which the administrative request is submitted to the system. Administrative requests can a ect access authorizations, derivation rules, or administrative authorizations, as follows.
Requests a ecting the authorizations on an object These are requests for granting or revoking authorizations on an object. The user requesting them must have either the own or the administer privilege on the object. Grant To grant an access mode on an object to a subject for a speci ed time interval. The grant operation results in the addition of a new temporal authorization. The starting time of the authorization must be greater than or equal to the time at which the authorization is inserted (it is not possible to specify retroactive authorizations).
Deny To deny an access mode on an object to a subject for a given time interval. The deny operation results in the addition of a new temporal negative authorization.
Revoke To revoke an access mode on an object from a subject. The revoke operation can be required with reference to a single authorization by specifying its label (i.e., the deletion of a speci c authorization is requested) or with reference to an access mode on an object with respect to a given time interval. The revoke operation results in the deletion or modi cation of all the temporal authorizations of the revokee for the access mode on the object granted by the user who revokes the privilege. If the time interval for which the revocation is requested spans from the time of the request to 1 all authorizations for the access mode on the object granted by the revokee to the revoker will be deleted. If the revocation is required for a speci c time interval, all the authorizations for the access mode on the object granted to the revokee by the revoker will be deleted or modi ed to exclude the interval (and possibly split in more authorizations). Note that a user can revoke only the authorizations he granted and then the revoke request by a user a ects only the authorizations granted by that speci c user.
Revoke negation To revoke the negation for an access mode on an object from a subject. It is analogous to the Revoke operation with the only exception that it applies to negative authorizations.
Requests a ecting rules
These are requests for specifying or deleting rules. The user requesting them must have either the own or the administer privilege on the object appearing at the left of the operator and either the own, administer, or refer privilege on the object appearing at the right of the operator.
Addrule To add a new derivation rule. The grantor of the authorization appearing at the left of the temporal operator identi es the user inserting the rule. Like for authorizations, the starting time of the interval associated with the rule must be greater than the time at which the request is speci ed.
Droprule To drop a derivation rule previously speci ed. The operation requires, as argument, the label of the rule to be deleted. Like for the revocation of authorizations, a user can drop only the rules that he has speci ed.
Requests a ecting administrative authorizations
These are requests for granting or revoking administrative privileges on an object. They can be executed only by the owner of the object.
Grantadm To grant the administer privilege on an object to a subject. It results in a new administrative authorization spanning from the time of the request to 1.
Revokeadm To revoke the administer privilege on an object to a subject. It results in: i) the deletion of the authorization for the administer privilege on the object previously granted to the revokee, and ii) the deletion of the authorizations on the object and of the derivation rules where the object appears in the authorization at the left of the operator speci ed by the revokee. If the revokee does not have the reference privilege on the object, also the derivation rules where the object appears in the authorization at the right of the operator are deleted.
Grantref To grant the refer privilege on an object to a subject.
Revokeref To revoke the refer privilege on an object to a subject. It results in the deletion of the authorization for the refer privilege on the object previously granted to the subject and in the deletion of all the rules granted by the revokee where the object appears in the authorization at the right of the operator. ::= hsubjecti j hobji ::= hobjecti j hacc-modi ::= haccess-modei j hstart-timei ::= # j hnat-numberi hend-timei ::= 1 j hnat-numberi j +hnat-numberi hnew-start-timei ::= hstart-timei j +hnat-numberi j ?hnat-numberi hnew-end-timei ::= hend-timei j ?hnat-numberi Execution of administrative operations illustrated in the previous section can change the set of valid authorizations. The TAB EXT has to be modi ed accordingly. For instance, the insertion of an explicit authorization can cause the deletion of authorizations from TAB EXT . This happens if the authorization appears in the right side of a negative rule, or if it is a negative authorization. A similar problem arises for authorization deletion.
We have devised a set of algorithms that update TAB EXT upon each administrative request, without the need of recomputing all the materialized authorizations. These algorithms use methods similar to those employed for the maintenance of materialized recursive views with negation 8].
The maintenance algorithms make use of sequences hL 1 : : : L k i and hX 1 ; : : : ; X k i, de ned in Section 4, that are permanently stored and updated by them to re ect the changes in TAB. The approach exploits the fact that, authorizations in TAB (i) EXT are derived using only authorizations in TAB (i?1)
EXT and rules in X i . Thus, a change for an authorization/rule of level i does not a ect authorization in TAB (j) EXT with j < i. Only authorizations in
EXT with j i need to be reconsidered.
In the following, we illustrate an algorithm for updating TAB EXT upon insertion of new positive authorizations, based on the Dred algorithm 8]. The methods to maintain TAB EXT after the insertion/deletion of a negative authorization and the deletion of a positive one are very similar to that for positive authorizations insertion. We refer the reader to 3] for the description of these algorithms and for the ones for insertion/deletion of derivation rules.
Insertion of explicit positive authorizations
The algorithm in Figure 7 Step 7 is an iteration on the levels returned by the CSD algorithm, starting from level l min . For each level i, the algorithm performs the following operations: compute the set X 0 i , for i >l min , by adding to X i the element hA k ; T k;i \ t b ,t e ]i, where T k;i \ t b ;t e ] is the set of time intervals representing all the time instants t 2 t b ,t e ] in which the inserted authorization is in level i; compute T, the set of time intervals representing all the time instants t 2 t b ,t e ] in which the inserted authorization is in level i and it is not blocked by a negative authorization; insert the element hA k ; Ti in S INS and in TAB u EXT ; call function`Dred-Ext()' that computes all the authorizations of level i which have to be inserted or removed from TAB u EXT because of the insertion of ( t b ;t e ];A k ).
Finally, the last step of the algorithm iteratively considers all the elements hA; Ti in the updated TAB EXT and substitutes each value t max in T with symbol`1'.
Function`Dred-Ext()', given a level l and the authorizations inserted and deleted from TAB u EXT till the current point in the computation, updates the TAB u EXT according to the rules that can be red in level l. The function consists of three main steps: step (a) adds to S DEL and removes from TAB u EXT an overestimate of the authorizations that need to be deleted because of the insertion of ( t b ;t e ];A k ). An authorization is added to S DEL by step (a) if the insertion of ( t b ;t e ];A k ) invalidates any derivation of the authorization from the elements of X 2) INST-TAB, TABEXT (each element denoted with hAi; Tii).
3) The sequence hL1; : : : ; L k i.
4) The sequence hX1,: : :,X k i (see Algorithm 4.1).
OUTPUT: 1) TAB u EXT (the updated TABEXT ).
2) The sequence hL 4 7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have presented an authorization model with temporal capabilities. The model introduces the concept of temporal authorization which is an authorization together with a start and an expiration time. Both negative as well as positive authorizations can be speci ed. Derivation rules can be expressed which allow new temporal authorizations to be derived on the basis of the presence or the absence of other temporal authorizations. Four di erent temporal operators can be used in the derivation rules. Administrative authorizations regulate the insertion and removal of authorizations and rules by users.
We have given the formal semantics of temporal authorizations and derivation rules in terms of a general logic program. The problem of ensuring the uniqueness of the derived authorizations corresponds to the theoretical issue of the existence of a unique model for the logic program. We have presented an approach to solve this problem based on the strati cation of authorizations and derivation rules. We have provided an algorithm that determines whether an authorization base has a strati cation and proved that, if the authorization base is strati ed, a unique set of derived authorizations is always computed.
Performance issues have been addressed and a materialization approach in which derived authorizations are explicitly stored has been proposed. Algorithms for building the materialized set of derived authorizations and for maintaining them upon execution of administrative operations have been proposed.
The proposed model is currently under implementation to investigate the system's performance for various characteristics of the authorization base.
We are currently extending this work in several directions. First, decentralized authorization administration facilities are being added to the model. Second, the model is being extended with periodic authorizations. Such capability allows to specify, for example, that a given subject may access a data item every Thursday. Also, access control based on past access histories will be included into the model. Finally, we plan to investigate di erent temporal logic formalisms and constraint logic programming as possible foundations for temporal authorization models.
